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CASE COMMENTS
ARBITRATION AND AwARD-VAiiTY oF AwAR--ScoPe. OF SUB-
MISSION AGREEMENT.-A long term contract for sale of gas to D from
P provided for an adjustment of sale price every five years by agree-
ment, or in case of disagreement, the question was to be submitted to
arbitrators, who were to "base their decision upon the then reasonable
market value of gas in that territory.. ." The parties failing to agree, the
question was submitted to three arbitrators, who considered prices paid
for gas in the specific area covered by the contract as well as in counties
abutting but outside the specific area. D refused to abide by an award
apparently based on these "outside" prices. P brings suit for specific per-
formance of the award and money judgment thereon. Held, that the
award was within the scope of the submission agreement. In determin-
ing a reasonable market value for a commodity in an area where con-
tract prices for that commodity were "pegged" by old contracts and
business practices, it was competent to consider contract prices in ad-
jacent areas to determine a reasonable market value for the commodity
within the specific area. Columbian Fuel Corp. v. United Fuel Gas Co.,
72 F. Supp. 843 (D.C.S.D. W. Va. 1947). The holding accords with
general principles of law relating to validity of awards attacked as not
within the scope of the submission. Arbitrators get their authority and
powers from the submission and any award not rendered within that au-
thority and power is invalid; but since the validity of each award, when
attacked on this ground, will depend upon the particular submission in
the case, it is not possible to formulate a hard and fast rule to govern all
cases. A review of past decisions, however, serves to show how far courts
have gone to uphold an award or to set it aside. Upon the question of
whether an award is within the terms of submission all fair presumptions
are made in favor of the award and if on any fair presumption the award
may be brought within the submission it will be sustained, Eureka Pipe
Line Co. v. Simms, 62 W. Va. 628, 59 S. E. 618 (1907) ; Republic of
Colombia v. Cauca Co., 106 F. 337 (C. C. W. Va. 1901), and awards are
to be liberally construed so as to give effect and operation to the intent
of the arbitrators, where it can be done. Wheeling Gas Co. v. Wheeling,
5 W. Va. 448 (1872) ; Fluharty v. Beatty, 22 W. Va. 698 (1883) ; Eur-
eka Pipe Line Co. v. Simms, supra. If the arbitrators have fairly exe-
cuted their submission, their award will not be set aside because it is
exorbitant. Eureka Pipe Line ;Co. v. Simms, supra; cf. Republic of
Colombia v. Cauca Co., supra; see Dickinson v. Chesapeake & 0. R. R.,
7 W. Va. 390, 435 (1873). An award which includes matters not sub-
mitted to the arbitrators will be declared invalid, Swann v. Dunn, 4 W.
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Va. 368 (1870); Dunlap v. Campbell, 5 W. Va. 195 (1872); Austin v.
Clark, 8 W. Va. 236 (1875); Simmons v. Simmons, 85 W. Va. 25, 100
S. E. 743 (1919), unless the part in excess can be clearly separated from
that within the submission, in which case the latter will stand. Republic
of Colombia v. Cauca Co., supna. Conversely, an award which does not
decide all matters submitted is invalid, Bean v. Bean, 25 W. Va. 604
(1885) ; but cf. Mutual Improvement Co. v. Merchants & Bus. Men's
Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 112 W. Va. 291, 164 S. E. 256 (1932) (arbitrators to
determine fire damage to party wall did not have to stipulate insured's
interest in party wall). Under a submission of several matters which
requires, either specially or impliedly, that a separate award be rendered
for each matter, the award is invalid if it embodies all in one general
award. Hines v. Fisher, 61 W. Va. 565, 56 S. E. 904 (1907). Unless the
submission restricts the arbitrators to the use of "legally admissible"
evidence, an award will not be set aside because "illegal" evidence is
received by the arbitrators in the course of their proceedings, unless it
plainly appears that the award was based on such evidence. Eureka Pipe
Line Co. v. Simms, supra; Brodhead-Garrett Co. v. Davis Lumber Co.,
97 W. Va. 165, 124 S. E. 600 (1924) ; see Boomer Coke & Coal Co. v.
Osenton, 101 W. Va. 683, 694, 133 S. E. 381 (1926). The presumption is
that the award rests on proper evidence. Eureka Pipe Line Co. v. Simms,
supra; but cf. Austin v. Clark, 8 W. Va. 236 (1875). Also, when arbi-
trators are not restricted to legal principles, an award based on mistake
of law is not invalid. Boomer Coke & Coal Co. v. Osenton, supra. Even
when they intend to decide by law, a mistake of law on a doubtful point
will not invalidate the award for to do so the mistake must be contrary
to well settled law. Mathews v. Miller, 25 W. Va. 817 (1885). When the
submission prescribes, expressly or by implication, a procedure for de-
termining an award, the award will be declared invalid if that pro-
cedure is not followed. Dickinson v. Chesapeake & 0. R. R., supra
(value found in stock instead of money) ; Providence Washington Ins.
Co. v. Morgantown Board of Education, 49 W. Va. 361, 38 S. E. 679
(1900) (fire damage not calculated according to policy terms) ; Raleigh
Coke & Coal Co. v. Mankin, 83 W. Va. 54,97 S. E. 299 (1918) (failure
to estimate timber and value properly) ; Bailey v. Triplett, 83 W. Va.
169, 98 S. E. 166 (1919) (property line); Goff v. Goff, 78 W. Va. 423,
89 S. E. 9 (1916) (failure to use deeds'as controlling in determining
dividing lines). All arbitrators must join in an award, unless otherwise
implied or expressed in the submission. Wheeling Gas Co. v. Wheeling,
supra; Stewart v. Monongalia County Court, 99 W. Va. 640, 130 S. E.
271 (1925); cf. Republic of Colombia v. Cauca Co., supra. However,
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when the submission calls for two arbitrators, who are to select an um-
pire in case of disagreement, an award rendered by two of the three is
valid, Stiringer v. Toy, 33 W. Va. 86, 10 S. E. 26 (1889); cf. Rogers v.
Corrothers, 26 W. Va. 238 (1885), but that one selected acting as an
original arbitrator or appraiser in making an award has been held reason
to vitiate the award. Providence Washington Ins. Co. v. Morgantown
Board of Education, supra (alternative holding).
P. N. B.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-SEPARATION OF POWERS-ISSUANCE OF
MUNICIPAL CHARTER BY CIRCUIT COURT.-A group of citizens of the
community of Chesapeake petitioned the circuit court of Kanawha
County to issue a certificate of incorporation to the town of Chesapeake
as a municipal corporation, under the provisions of W. VA. REv. CODE
(Michie, 1943) c. 8, art. 2, the provisions thereof being satisfied. The
circuit court dismissed the petition, holding that W. VA. CONST., Art.
V, made the statute void and unconstitutional in that it required a cir-
cuit court to perform a purely legislative function. Held, on writ of error,
constitutional, affirming a line of decisions beginning with In re Town
of Union Mines, 39 W. Va. 179, 19 S. E. 398 (1894), on grounds of
public policy. In re Town of Chesapeake, 45 S. E. (2d) 113 (W. Va.
1947).
The delegation of power to the courts to issue charters to municipal
corporations has been the subject of much dissension among the courts
of the various states. Some have held the delegation in this type of case
void in all instances as a violation of the doctrine of separation of powers.
Udall v. Severn, 53 Ariz. 65, 79 P. (2d) 347 (1938). Others have held
it valid if there is no exercise of discretion on the part of the court, but
only a determination of the facts as to compliance with the statute, the
court performing a ministerial duty in issuing the charter. State ex rel.
Fire District v. Smith, 353 Mo. 807, 184 S. W. (2d) 593 (1945). Still
others, as in the instant case, hold that although a certain amount of dis-
cretion is involved, it is a valid delegation which does not violate the con-
stitution. Board of Supervisors v. Duke, 113 Va. 94, 73 S. E. 456 (1912) ;
Morris v. Tzylor, 70 W .Va. 618, 74 S. E. 872 (1912). It had been
apprehended that the application of the "new and strict" rule, see In re
Town of Chesapeake, 45 S. E. 113, 117 (W. Va. 1947), of Hodges v.
Public Service Comm., 110 W. Va. 649, 159 S. E. 834 (1931), might
cause a repudiation of the results in situations where comparable delega-
tions of power had theretofore been sustained. Davis, Yudicial Review of
Administrative Action in West Virginia-A Study in Separation of
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